

Speaking Notes

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National Chair
Canadian Federal Pilots Association

to

The House of Commons Standing Committee on
Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

Study on Aviation Safety

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Check against delivery

Good morning.

CFPA members work as Transport Canada's most highly skilled aviation inspectors. I am here to add their frontline perspective to this important study.

Our message is sobering.

We are witnessing the dismantling of aviation safety oversight in Canada and the progressive weakening of Transport Canada's inspectorate.

This state of affairs has been years in the making.

Piece by piece, the checks and balances that have delivered one of the safest aviation systems in the world are falling victim to cost cutting and misguided management. Meanwhile, the perishable skills and competencies of inspectors are deliberately being allowed to wither.

All the while, Transport Canada officials reassure you that all is well.

But, consider this.

A dangerous culture of non-compliance and secrecy has set in over the years.

Transport Canada has come to regard safety regulations and international safety requirements as little more than inconveniences that can be ignored to satisfy budget limitations or industry pressure, and without regard to public safety.

I say dangerous, because this culture affects aviation in Canada at large.

A recent example.

Last August, without consultation and in secret, Transport Canada completely withdrew or reduced safety oversight from a significant portion of aviation including:

- All airports in the country
- Business aircraft like those Jim Prentice and Jean Lapierre died in
- Urban heliports, and
- Aircraft that do dangerous work like fire bombing

[See Tab 1 for reference]

While assuring you that inspection is robust, Transport Canada watered down its inspection process in order to boost its 2016 performance metrics¹.

These and other decisions have been taken without notice to Parliament, MPs or the public through a bureaucratic tool called an Internal Process Bulletin, a practice the department is using with increasing regularity.

Transport Canada is quietly planning to roll back oversight even further by:

- Completely washing its hands of monitoring the proficiency of pilots
- Delegating professional pilot exams to industry, and
- Allowing airlines to set their own operational safety standards without checking

[See Tab 2 for references]

With the cancellation of the Inspection and Audit Manual, Transport Canada gave up its ability to ensure compliance with the safety regulations.

[See Tab 3 for reference]

This singular reliance on SMS puts Canada offside with ICAO, which requires member states to establish and maintain safety through direct operational oversight.

In fact, Canada fails to meet more than half of ICAO's mandatory minimum safety requirements. That's right. Transport Canada is off-side with 8 out of 13 of ICAO's mandatory minimums. These are requirements, not just suggestions. Our assessment of Canada's performance in this regard can be found at Tab 4.

[See Tab 4 for reference]

In keeping with its default toward secrecy, Transport Canada hasn't notified ICAO of these deficiencies as required of member states.

You may be wondering how it is possible for my remarks to be so different from the story you heard earlier from Transport Canada.

¹ "The primary objective of this temporary program change is to increase the inspection capacity to meet the 2016/2017 National Oversight Plan by leveraging existing albeit leaner surveillance tools." Source: Transport Canada IPB 2016-03 issued on July 29, 2016.

I was struck by the misleading nature of the testimony you heard from officials. It deserves the reality check we have produced for your information.

[See Tab 5 for reference]

We should be able to provide the Minister with a signed written statement that the inspected airline is fully compliant with all safety regulations. Right now, an inspector not able to do that. That is why I urge your committee to recommend that the government reinstate compliance audits to determine if an airline is in compliance with safety requirements or not.

On behalf of the public, the Minister needs to know if the airlines are meeting safety requirements, not whether they have a good SMS or not. To paraphrase Ronald Regan, the public is expecting the Minister to trust the airlines to act in their own self-interest, but, also, to verify that safety standards and requirements are being met.

Without this change, an aviation disaster on the scale of Lac Mégantic is very likely.

Transport Canada must be put on a tighter leash. No more sweeping decisions to dismantle oversight made in secret. Require Transport Canada to justify in a public forum, such as this committee, why less oversight means more safety.

It has been more than a decade since ICAO last audited Canada's aviation safety oversight system in 2005. Your committee should recommend that Transport Canada invite ICAO to complete a full assessment of Canada's compliance with minimum international safety requirements.

Finally, we concur with Justice Virgil Moshansky's recommendation for a Commission of Inquiry into aviation safety oversight. We agree it is long overdue.

Thank you.

**Civil Aviation****INTERNAL PROCESS BULLETIN****Aviation civile****BULLETIN INTERNE DE PROCÉDURES****ATTENTION:**

CIVIL AVIATION STAFF MEMBERS
INVOLVED IN SURVEILLANCE PLANNING

À L'ATTENTION DES :

MEMBRES DE L'AVIATION CIVILE
PARTICIPANT À LA PLANIFICATION DE
SURVEILLANCE

**TEMPORARY CHANGES TO
SURVEILLANCE PLANNING AND
SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES****CHANGEMENTS TEMPORAIRES À LA
PLANIFICATION DE LA SURVEILLANCE ET
AUX ACTIVITÉS DE SURVEILLANCE****DOCUMENTS AFFECTED:**

Civil Aviation Directive (CAD) SUR-008 –
Surveillance Policy

Staff Instruction (SI) SUR-009 – *National
Surveillance Planning Standard*

DOCUMENTS À MODIFIER :

D directive d'aviation civile (DAC) SUR-008 – *Politique
de surveillance*

Instruction visant le personnel (IP) SUR-009 – *Norme
nationale de planification de la surveillance*

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this bulletin is to provide information relating to temporary changes in the surveillance frequency and planned surveillance activities for certain Civil Aviation Document holders.

OBJET :

Le présent bulletin a pour but de fournir des renseignements sur le changement temporaire de la fréquence de la surveillance et des activités de surveillance prévues qui s'appliquent aux titulaires de documents de l'Aviation civile.

DOCUMENTS:

TCCA surveillance planning is conducted in accordance with procedures described in Staff Instruction (SI) SUR-009 and Civil Aviation Directive (CAD) SUR-008. These documents provide the policy and procedural framework for establishing the interval at which surveillance will be performed.

DOCUMENTS :

Les activités de surveillance de TCAC sont effectuées conformément aux procédures décrites dans l'instruction visant le personnel (IP) SUR-009 et le Directive d'aviation civile (DAC) SUR-008. Ces documents fournissent le cadre de politiques et de procédures nécessaire pour établir l'intervalle selon lequel les activités de surveillance seront réalisées.

BACKGROUND / DISCUSSION:

In 2012, Transport Canada introduced a risk based approach to surveillance planning. An enterprise's surveillance interval is derived directly from its safety risk profile, which is determined using a combination of its Risk Indicator Level (RIL) and Impact Value.

The Risk Indicator Level of an enterprise is generated using a combination of risk data collected by TCCA. This value provides a representation of the likelihood that risks are being managed by the enterprise.

The Impact Value of an enterprise is generated by considering the size and scope of their operation. This value is a representation of the enterprise's impact on the aviation transportation system and on the public's confidence in this system.

The results of the RIL and the Impact Value are plotted onto a Surveillance Interval Matrix that provides a planned surveillance interval of 1 year (high risk and/or high impact organizations) to 5 years (low risk and/or low impact organizations).

The 5 year forecast provides senior management with a long range view of planned surveillance activities for TCCA approved enterprises. The 5 year forecast takes into account the surveillance intervals set in accordance with CAD SUR-008 and the complexity ratings established in SI SUR 009.

The National Civil Aviation Management Executive (NCAMX) has agreed to temporary changes to the universal approach to applicability taken in CAD SUR 008 and SI SUR 009. In effect, NCAMX has determined that the level of risk associated with certain Civil Aviation Document (CAD) holders is lower than others. Therefore, the surveillance frequency and/or activity can be adjusted to reflect the level of risk.

CONTEXTE/DISCUSSION :

En 2012, Transports Canada a adopté une approche fondée sur le risque à la planification de la surveillance. L'intervalle de surveillance d'une entreprise doit être déterminé directement à partir de son profil de risque de sécurité, lui-même déterminé en utilisant à la fois son indicateur de niveau de risque et sa valeur d'incidence.

Le niveau de l'indicateur de risque d'une entreprise est généré en utilisant une combinaison de données sur les risques recueillis par TCAC. Cette valeur donne une représentation de la probabilité que les risques soient gérés par l'entreprise.

La valeur d'incidence d'une entreprise est générée en considérant la taille et la portée de ses opérations. Cette valeur est une représentation de l'incidence de l'entreprise sur le réseau de transport aérien et sur la confiance du public dans ce réseau.

Les résultats du NIR et la valeur d'incidence sont saisis dans une matrice d'intervalle de surveillance qui offre un intervalle de surveillance prévue d'un an (risques élevés ou organisations à forte incidence) à 5 ans (risques faibles ou organisations à faible incidence).

La prévision sur cinq ans offre à la haute direction une vue à long terme des activités de surveillance prévues pour les entreprises approuvées par TCAC. La prévision sur cinq ans tiendra compte des intervalles de surveillance établis conformément au DAC SUR-008 et aux niveaux de complexité énoncés dans l'IP SUR-009.

Le Conseil national de la direction de la gestion de l'Aviation civile (CNDGAC) a accepté que des changements temporaires soient apportés à l'approche universelle d'applicabilité adoptée dans le DAC SUR-008 et dans l'IP SUR-009. En fait, le CNDGAC a déterminé que le niveau de risque associé à certains titulaires de documents de l'Aviation civile (DAC) est inférieur à d'autres. Par conséquent, la fréquence ou les activités de surveillance peuvent être ajustées pour refléter le niveau de risque.

POLICY STATEMENT:

The following CAD holders will be exempt from the Civil Aviation planning policy and procedures defined in CAD SUR 008 and SI SUR 009. No planned surveillance activities will be conducted for operations under:

- CAR 702
- CAR 305
- CAR 604
- Standards 563 (Organisations approved to distribute aeronautical products)

In addition, holders of an Airport Certificate issued under CAR 302.03 will be subject to planned surveillance in the form of a program validation inspection. No assessment activities will be conducted.

In accordance with the National Aviation Safety Information Management System (NASIMS) risk indicators, as described in CAD SUR 008, SI SUR 009 and SI SUR 005, ongoing monitoring of these CAD holders will continue.

A rise in the NASIMS risk indicator level, a serious incident or accident or any other cause for concern related to an individual CAD holder should be reviewed by the Regional Director Civil Aviation. Any decrease in the acceptable level of safety may trigger increased monitoring or surveillance.

In order to monitor the acceptable level of safety in these areas, an evaluation of the impact of this IPB will be conducted in one year and as part of the Risk Assessment in the context of the CAR 702 and associated standard.

DÉCLARATION DE POLITIQUE GÉNÉRALE :

Les titulaires des DAC suivants seront exemptés de l'application des politiques et des procédures de planification de l'Aviation civile énoncées dans le DAC SUR-008 et dans l'IP SUR-009. Aucune activité de surveillance prévue ne sera menée à l'égard des opérations sous :

- la sous-partie 702 du RAC
- la sous-partie 305 du RAC
- la sous-partie 604 du RAC
- entreprises agréées pour la distribution de matériels aéronautiques, conformément à la Norme 563 du RAC.

De plus, les titulaires de certificats d'aéroports délivrés en vertu de l'article 302.03 du RAC seront assujettis à une surveillance prévue sous forme d'inspection de validation des programmes. Aucune activité d'évaluation ne sera menée.

Conformément aux indicateurs de risque du Système de gestion de l'information sur la sécurité de l'aviation nationale (SGINSA), décrits dans le DAC SUR-008, dans l'IP SUR-009 et dans l'IP SUR-005, la supervision de ces titulaires de DAC se poursuivra.

Une augmentation du niveau de l'indicateur de risque du SGINSA, un incident ou un accident grave, ou toute autre inquiétude liée à un titulaire de DAC individuel devrait être examinée par le directeur régional de l'Aviation civile. Toute baisse du niveau de sécurité acceptable pourrait déclencher une augmentation de la supervision ou de la surveillance.

Pour contrôler le niveau de sécurité acceptable dans ces secteurs, une évaluation de l'incidence du présent BIP sera effectuée dans un an et dans le cadre de l'évaluation des risques au sujet de la sous-partie 702 du RAC et les normes connexes.

CONTACT OFFICE:

For more information concerning this issue, please contact the Director, Standards.

BUREAU RESPONSABLE :

Pour de plus amples renseignements concernant cette question, communiquez avec le directeur des Normes.

Original signed by / L'originale a été signée par :

Robert Sincennes

Robert Sincennes

Director | Directeur

STANDARDS | NORMES

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Air Transport Association of Canada Conference

November 16, 2016

Denis Guindon

**Director General, Aviation Safety
Oversight and Transformation**

Aaron McCrorie

**Director General, Aviation Safety
Regulatory Framework**





MOVING FORWARD

- Online Environment and Transformation
- Civil Aviation Service Integration Project
- Manual Review Project
- Minimum Equipment List (MEL) Approval Project
- Delegation of Professional Exams to Industry
- Approved Check Pilot Delegation
- Surveillance Program Evaluation and Update Project
- Strategic Planning and Resource Alignment Project
- Changes to Cold Temperature in 2016-17 *Transport Canada HOT Guidelines*

***Civil Aviation*****INTERNAL PROCESS BULLETIN*****Aviation civile*****BULLETIN INTERNE DE
PROCÉDURES****ATTENTION:**

PRAIRIE AND NORTHERN REGION CIVIL AVIATION STAFF MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THE APPROVAL OF MANUALS OF TRANSPORT CANADA CIVIL AVIATION (TCCA) CERTIFICATED ENTERPRISES

À L'ATTENTION DES :

MEMBRES DU PERSONNEL DE L'AVIATION CIVILE DES PRAIRIES ET DU NORD QUI APPROUVENT LES MANUELS DES ENTREPRISES CERTIFIÉES DE TRANSPORTS CANADA, AVIATION CIVILE (TCAC)

Alternate Procedures For The Approval Of Amendments To Manuals In Accordance With CARs 703.104, 704.120, 705.134, 706.08 and CAR 573.10

Autres procédures pour l'approbation des modifications aux manuels conformément aux paragraphes 703.104, 704.120, 705.134, 706.08 et 573.10 du RAC

DOCUMENTS AFFECTED:**DOCUMENTS À MODIFIER :**

Transport Canada Publication (TP) 4711	Publication de Transports Canada (TP) 4711
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PURPOSE:**OBJET :**

The purpose of this bulletin is to provide guidelines for a trial project in Prairie and Northern Region to evaluate the effectiveness of an alternate process for the approval of amendments to manuals.	Le présent bulletin a pour objet de fournir des lignes directrices dans le cadre du projet pilote effectué dans la Région des Prairies et du Nord en vue d'évaluer l'efficacité d'un autre processus d'approbation des modifications aux manuels.
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DOCUMENTS:**DOCUMENTS :**

TCCA certification activities in relation to CAR Part VII AOC holders are conducted in accordance with Transport Canada Publication (TP) 4711.

Les activités de certification de TCAC qui visent les titulaires d'un certificat d'exploitation aérienne (CEA) en vertu de la partie VII du *Règlement de l'aviation canadien* (RAC) sont menées conformément à Publication de Transports Canada (TP) 4711.

BACKGROUND / DISCUSSION:

The issue of levels of service related to the approval of manuals has been a regular topic of discussion between Transport Canada and the civil aviation industry. In an effort to address this issue and improve the efficiency of the manual approval process, Transport Canada has reviewed its processes and in some cases streamlined the activity, the AOC certification process for example.

TCCA is proposing additional activities to address this issue and to make this process more efficient. Commencing in April 2015, the Prairie and Northern region (PNR) will start a pilot project that offers select enterprises the opportunity to amend, implement and utilize amendments to their approved manuals. Participants will be required to develop an approved process for the amendment of Manuals in keeping with the requirements of this IPB.

The trial project will be limited in scope (no more than 6 enterprises).

In addition to the pilot project TCCA has proposed a review of all certification and service activities carried out by TCCA personnel. In March 2015, TCCA will convene the Transport Canada Civil Aviation Certification of Aviation Organizations and Service Review Project.

Data received from the PNR trial project will be forwarded to the Chairs of the Transport Canada Civil Aviation Certification of Aviation Organizations and Service Review Project for their consideration.

The National Civil Aviation Management Executive (NCAMX) will review the data to determine whether a broader expansion of the project regionally or nationally should be considered. Additionally, NCAMX will decide whether a permanent regulatory change should be made.

BACKGROUND / DISCUSSION:

La question des niveaux de service liée à l'approbation des manuels est souvent abordée lors des discussions entre Transports Canada et l'industrie de l'aviation civile. Afin de régler cette question et d'améliorer l'efficacité du processus d'approbation des manuels, le Ministère a examiné ses processus et a simplifié ses activités dans certains cas, par exemple, le processus de certification d'exploitation aérienne.

TCAC propose des activités supplémentaires afin de régler cette question et d'accroître l'efficacité du processus. En avril 2015, la Région des Prairies et du Nord (RPN) lancera un projet pilote qui offrira aux entreprises retenues la possibilité de changer, de mettre en œuvre et d'utiliser des modifications à leurs manuels approuvés. Les participants devront élaborer un processus approuvé pour modifier les manuels en respectant les exigences de ce bulletin interne de procédures (BIP).

La portée du projet pilote sera limitée (participation d'un maximum de six entreprises).

En outre le projet pilote, TCAC a proposé un examen de l'ensemble des activités de certification et de prestation de services effectuées par le personnel de TCAC. En mars 2015, TCAC convoquera les responsables du projet d'examen de la certification des organisations de l'aviation et de la prestation de services de TCAC.

Les données du projet pilote de la RPN seront transmises aux présidents du projet d'examen de la certification des organisations de l'aviation et la prestation de services aux fins d'étude.

Le Conseil national de la direction de la gestion de l'aviation civile (CNDGAC) examinera les données afin de décider s'il est nécessaire d'élargir la portée du projet à l'échelle régionale et nationale. Le CNDGAC décidera également s'il convient d'apporter une modification réglementaire permanente.

POLICY STATEMENT:

In order to implement a simplified process for approving Company Operations Manuals and associated chapters, Maintenance Policy Manuals and maintenance control Manuals, TCCA will introduce a revised process applicable to select companies operating in PNR.

The trial project will apply initially to the COM, MCM and MPM. Consideration will be given to extending the manual amendment process approval to other documents such as MELs and operating specifications depending on the enterprise's success in the trial project.

Participants in this pilot project may make amendments to all or some of their approved manuals through the use of their approved process. In effect, the trial project provides the enterprise with the authority to amend and implement changes to their manual immediately.

The enterprise will still be required to send TCCA a copy of all amendments to Manuals and other related documentation to ensure TCCA holds an updated copy.

TCCA will select the enterprises participating in this project in the following manner. In order to qualify for the pilot project the enterprise must be able to meet the requirements outlined in this IPB, be recommended by the responsible PI(s) and TTL and must be selected by PNR senior management (Associate Director Operations - ADOs) for participation in the trial project.

Selection Criteria:

To assist in the selection of candidates, PI(s) and TTLs are encouraged to consider some or all of the following criteria to determine the enterprise's suitability for the project:

- The enterprise's surveillance record as per previous surveillance reports. The review should consider whether:
 - CAPs have been completed on time and in a satisfactory manner.
 - Past surveillance reports reveal only minor or moderate findings.
 - Major systemic findings have been resolved in an effective manner.

ÉNONCÉ DE POLITIQUE :

En vue de mettre en œuvre un processus simplifié pour approuver les manuels d'exploitation de la compagnie (MEC) et les chapitres connexes, les manuels de politiques de maintenance (MPM) ainsi que les manuels de contrôle de la maintenance (MCM), TCAC instaurera un processus révisé aux fins d'utilisation par les entreprises sélectionnées de la RPN.

Au début, le projet pilote visera les MEC, les MPM et les MCM. On envisagera également la possibilité d'appliquer le processus d'approbation des modifications aux manuels à d'autres documents, comme la liste minimale d'équipements (LME) et les spécifications d'exploitation, selon le succès de l'entreprise dans le cadre du projet pilote.

Les participants au projet pilote peuvent apporter des modifications à l'ensemble ou à certains de leurs manuels d'approbation en utilisant leur processus approuvé. Le projet pilote autorise les entreprises à modifier ou à mettre en œuvre des changements à leur manuel immédiatement.

Les entreprises devront continuer à envoyer à TCAC une copie de toutes les modifications qu'ils ont apportées à leurs manuels ou à d'autres documents connexes afin de s'assurer que TCAC détient une copie à jour.

TCAC choisira les entreprises qui participeront à ce projet de la manière décrite ci-dessous. Afin d'être admissible au projet pilote, une entreprise doit être en mesure de satisfaire aux exigences décrites dans le présent BIP, doit être recommandée par un ou plusieurs inspecteurs principaux et chefs d'équipe technique responsables, et doit être sélectionnée par un membre de la haute direction de la RPN (directeur associé des Opérations – DAO).

Critères de sélection :

Afin de faciliter le processus de sélection, les IP et les CET doivent tenir compte de certains ou de l'ensemble des critères suivants en vue d'évaluer la pertinence d'une entreprise à participer au projet :

- Le dossier de surveillance de l'entreprise est conforme aux rapports de surveillance précédents. L'examen doit tenir compte de ce qui suit :
 - les plans de mesures correctives (PMC) ont-ils été remplis à temps et de manière satisfaisante?
 - Les résultats des rapports de surveillance antérieurs ont-ils seulement révélé des constatations mineures ou modérées?

- The enterprise's National Aviation Safety Information Management System (NASIMS) risk score. Is the score at an acceptable level (generally the score results in a 3 year cycle) or have there been major changes in the NASIMS score in the past 12 months.
- The enterprise's willingness to participate in a pilot project and to be subject to additional surveillance activities as required.
- Does the enterprise have an approved quality assurance program in accordance with CAR 573.09 or CAR 706.07?
- Has the enterprises voluntarily implemented a QAP?
- The enterprise's ability to establish and maintain effective processes including a manual amendment process that meets the requirements of this IPB.

Manual Amendment Process Requirements

The enterprise will submit for TCCA approval a process for the amendment of manuals that reflects the requirements of this IPB. The process should describe the requested scope of the changes being made under the approved process.

The scope of the manual amendment will **not** involve a significant change to enterprise operations or activities. Such as, but not limited to:

- the introduction of a new aircraft type,
- a transition from day VFR to night IFR operations or
- a change in AMO ratings.

The scope of the manual amendment privileges may be extended at the discretion of the PI(s) based on the enterprise's effective implementation and use of the manual amendment process.

- Les importantes constatations systémiques ont-elles été réglées de manière efficace?
- La note de risque du système de gestion d'information nationale sur la sécurité aérienne (SGNSA) de l'entreprise : si la note se situe à un niveau acceptable (habituellement la note obtenue après un cycle de trois ans), ou s'il y a eu des changements importants à la note du SGNSA au cours des 12 derniers mois.
- La disposition de l'entreprise à participer au projet pilote et à des activités de surveillance supplémentaires au besoin.
- L'entreprise possède-t-elle un programme d'assurance de la qualité approuvé en vertu du RAC 573.09 ou du RAC 706.07?
- L'entreprise a-t-elle volontairement mis en œuvre un programme d'assurance de la qualité (PAQ)?
- La capacité de l'entreprise à établir et à maintenir des processus efficaces, y compris un processus de modification des manuels qui satisfait aux exigences du présent BIP.

Exigences relatives au processus de modification des manuels

L'entreprise présentera à TCAC un processus de modification des manuels qui tient compte des exigences du présent BIP aux fins d'approbation. Le processus devrait décrire la portée requise des changements apportés dans le cadre du processus approuvé.

La portée des modifications apportées aux manuels n'entraînera **pas** un changement profond au niveau des activités de l'entreprise. Ces modifications comprennent sans toutefois s'y limiter ce qui suit :

- l'introduction d'un nouveau modèle d'aéronef;
- la transition d'opérations VFR de jour à des opérations VFR de nuit;
- un changement aux notes des OMA.

Les priviléges liés à la portée des modifications apportées aux manuels peuvent être prolongés à la discrétion des IP en fonction de l'efficacité de la mise en œuvre et de l'utilisation du processus de modification des manuels par l'entreprise.

The process should include:

- management control procedures,
- quality assurance procedures as applicable,
- training as required,
- documentation control procedures, and
- the enterprise's certificates and manuals this will apply to.

TCCA Process Acceptance

In order to be accepted for the pilot project the TCCA principal inspector(s) (PIs) will review the manual approval process and approve or reject the process.

Where the enterprise holds more than one certificate a joint team including (as necessary) Flight Operations, Cabin Safety and Airworthiness will complete the approval process.

Enterprises receiving approval from TCCA may proceed to implement and use the process for amendments to Manuals.

Enterprises that do not receive TCCA approval will work with TCCA to improve the process and receive approval. In addition to the initial submission, the enterprise will be given one additional opportunity to submit process amendments. Should the additional submission not be satisfactory the enterprise will no longer be eligible for the pilot project.

TCCA Surveillance

TCCA will monitor through planned surveillance the following:

- the use of the process;
- the quality of amendments to manuals;
- the effectiveness of the process,
- the application of quality assurance procedures to the manual amendment process, as applicable; and
- improvements, as required, to the process resulting from internal quality assurance audit findings or other findings.

In cases where the enterprise is not scheduled for planned surveillance until 2016 a process inspection will be used to monitor the latter.

Le processus devrait comprendre ce qui suit :

- des procédures de contrôle de la gestion;
- des procédures d'assurance de la qualité, au besoin;
- de la formation, au besoin;
- des procédures de contrôle des documents;
- les certificats et les manuels des entreprises concernées..

Acceptation du processus de TCAC

Afin d'être accepté dans le cadre du projet pilote, le processus d'approbation des manuels doit être examiné par les IP de TCAC, qui l'approuvera ou le rejetera.

Lorsqu'une entreprise détient plus d'un certificat, une équipe mixte composée (au besoin) de responsables des Opérations aériennes, de la Sécurité des cabines et de la Navigabilité complèteront le processus d'approbation

Les entreprises approuvées par TCAC pourront mettre en œuvre et utiliser le processus de modification des manuels.

Les entreprises qui ne sont pas approuvées par TCAC collaboreront avec TCAC afin d'améliorer le processus et de le faire approuver. Si sa présentation initiale n'est pas acceptée, l'entreprise pourra présenter une deuxième fois les modifications apportées au processus. Si cette deuxième présentation n'est pas satisfaisante, l'entreprise ne sera plus admissible à participer au projet pilote.

Surveillance de TCAC

TCAC surveillera ce qui suit dans le cadre d'activités de surveillance prévues :

- l'utilisation du processus;
- la qualité des modifications apportées aux manuels;
- l'efficacité du processus;
- l'application des procédures d'assurance de la qualité dans le cadre du processus de modification des manuels, le cas échéant;
- les améliorations apportées au processus à la suite de constatations découlant de la vérification de l'assurance de la qualité interne ou d'autres constatations.

Lorsqu'il n'est pas prévu qu'une entreprise fasse l'objet d'une surveillance avant 2016, un processus d'inspection sera utilisé pour assurer une surveillance.

The results of the surveillance activity will be used to determine whether the enterprise will be allowed to continue using the revised manual approval process.

Where TCCA determines that the process is not being used and/or is not effective, TCCA will advise the company that it is no longer part of the pilot project and is now subject to the normal manual approval process.

Where an enterprise is no longer considered part of the trial project and there is evidence that the approved process has not been used or other Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) have been wilfully or deliberately violated, a corrective action plan will be required and punitive action may be taken.

TCCA PIs may supplement planned or unplanned surveillance with a review of the manual amendments submitted by the enterprise. In this case sampling should be used to review parts of the submission to establish confidence in the enterprise's process. This may lead to further sampling or additional surveillance.

Pilot Project Participants

Prospective participants in this pilot project will be identified and notified by TCCA personnel of their selection.

The PI(s) will brief the enterprise on the contents of this IPB and the process requirements.

Participant process submissions should be sent to the enterprise PI(s) for review and approval.

Timeframe

The pilot project will commence April 2015 to December 2016.

Les résultats des activités de surveillance serviront à déterminer si une entreprise sera autorisée à continuer d'utiliser le processus révisé d'approbation des manuels.

Lorsque TCAC détermine que le processus n'est pas utilisé ou qu'il n'est pas efficace, il informera l'entreprise qu'elle ne fait plus partie du projet pilote et qu'elle sera assujettie au processus courant d'approbation des manuels.

Lorsqu'une entreprise ne fait plus partie du projet pilote et qu'il a été démontré que le processus approuvé n'a pas été utilisé ou que des dispositions du RAC n'ont pas été respectées, de façon volontaire ou délibérée, un PMC devra être établi et des mesures punitives pourraient être prises.

Les IP de TCAC pourraient améliorer les activités de surveillance prévues ou non prévues en examinant les modifications aux manuels présentées par l'entreprise. Dans ce cas, un échantillonnage devrait être utilisé pour examiner certains volets de la présentation afin d'établir un sentiment de confiance à l'égard du processus de l'entreprise. Cela pourrait entraîner le prélèvement d'autres échantillonnages ou la réalisation d'autres activités de surveillance.

Participants au projet pilote

Les participants sélectionnés pour participer au projet pilote seront avisés par le personnel de TCAC.

Les IP informeront les entreprises sélectionnées du contenu du présent BIP et des exigences relatives au processus.

Le processus de présentation des participants devrait être envoyé aux entreprises et les PI se chargeront de les examiner et de les approuver, le cas échéant.

Calendrier

Le projet pilote débutera en avril 2015 et se terminera en décembre 2016.

CONTACT OFFICE:

For more information concerning this issue, contact a Transport Canada Centre; or contact Jacqueline Booth, Standards Branch in Ottawa, by telephone at (613) 952-7974 by fax at (613) 952-3298 or by e-mail at jacqueline.booth@tc.gc.ca

BUREAU RESPONSABLE :

Pour de plus amples renseignements concernant cette question, veuillez communiquer avec un Centre de Transports Canada ou avec Jacqueline Booth, Direction des normes, Ottawa, par téléphone au 613-952-4371, par télécopieur au 613-952-3298 ou par courriel à l'adresse suivante : jacqueline.booth@tc.gc.ca.

[original signed by / original signé par]

Aaron McCrorie
Director | Directeur
STANDARDS | NORMES



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Transport Canada

(<http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/menu.htm>)

[Home](#) → [Air Transportation](#) → [Aviation Safety](#) → [Publications and Videos](#) → TP 8606 - Inspection and Audit Manual

TP 8606 - Inspection and Audit Manual

CANCELLATION NOTICE

The **Inspection and Audit Manual (TP 8606)**, 2005-07 is cancelled effective June 28, 2013.

The information contained in TP 8606 is included in the staff instruction **Surveillance Procedures SI SUR-001 Issue 5** which was published June 28, 2013

TP 8606 is therefore cancelled.

Original signed by
Aaron McCrorie
Director, Standards Branch

Date modified:

2013-07-11

Mandatory International Safety Oversight Minimum Requirements (ICAO Annex 19 – Safety Management - http://cockpitdata.com/Gallery/download/20)	Transport Canada
	Pass Fail
1. Primary aviation legislation	
1.1 Comprehensive and effective aviation law	✓
1.2 Ensures access to aviation licence holders	✓
2. Specific operating regulations	✓
3. State system and functions	
3.1 The State shall establish an adequately financed agency with sufficient and qualified staff to meet stated safety objectives	✗ ₁
3.2 Recommendation only	
3.3 The State shall provide ethics, personal conduct and conflict of interest guidelines to its staff	✓
3.4 Recommendation only	
4. Qualified technical personnel	
4.1 Establish minimum qualification standards for inspectors & provide initial and recurrent training	✗ ₂
4.2 Maintain training records	✗ ₃
5. Technical guidance, tools and provision of safety-critical information	
5.1 The State shall provide inspectors facilities, comprehensive and up-to-date technical guidance material and procedures, safety-critical information, tools and equipment, and transportation means, as applicable, to the technical personnel to enable them to perform their safety oversight functions effectively and in accordance with established procedures in a standardized manner.	✗ ₄
5.2 provide technical guidance to the aviation industry on relevant regulations	✓
6. Licensing, certification, authorization and/or approval obligations	
The States shall implement documented processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations performing an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are allowed to exercise the privileges of a licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval to conduct the relevant aviation activity.	✗ ₅
7. Surveillance obligations	
The State shall implement documented surveillance processes, by defining and planning inspections, audits, and monitoring activities on a continuous basis, to proactively assure that aviation licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval holders continue to meet the established requirements. This includes the surveillance of personnel designated by the Authority to perform safety oversight functions on its behalf.	✗ ₆

8. Resolution of safety issues	
8.1 The State shall use a documented process to take appropriate corrective actions, up to and including enforcement measures, to resolve identified safety issues.	 ₇
8.2 The State shall ensure that identified safety issues are resolved in a timely manner through a system which monitors and records progress, including actions taken by service providers in resolving such issues.	 ₈

¹ Transport Canada fails to meet obligation 3.2 “sufficient and qualified personnel and provided with adequate financial resources”

Civil Aviation Inspectors do not have the mandatory training required to carry out duties on behalf of the Minister and a growing number no longer have a valid pilot licence. There are significant staff shortages and the department continually takes steps to reduce its oversight obligations to match shrinking personnel and budgets. Training and oversight activities are often modified, not scheduled or cancelled because of a lack of financial resources.

² Transport Canada fails to meet obligation 4.1 “establish minimum qualification requirements for the technical personnel performing safety oversight functions and provide for appropriate initial and recurrent training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level”

Transport Canada has established criteria for the Issuance of Official Credentials as they relate to TCCA inspector/officer functions and duties and these are documented in Civil Aviation Directive (CAD) [ADM-005](#) and Staff Instruction [SI-REG-014](#). But, TC Managers are authorizing the issue of full credentials when mandatory training has not been completed.

Nine of ten mandatory courses are currently not being provided to staff. [Abacus Data reports](#) that 45 % of Civil Aviation Inspectors have not received their mandatory training and 70% are required to carry out tasks they are not trained for.

After a 2012 Auditor General report found Transport Canada does not provide training inspectors need to do their jobs, an internal [Transport Canada audit in 2016](#) found the Department still had not acted to resolve these shortcomings.

³ Transport Canada fails to meet obligation 4.2 “The State shall implement a system for the maintenance of training records.”

Transport Canada does not keep adequate training records for their inspectors. The internal [Transport Canada audit in 2016 recommends:](#)

“Civil Aviation should ensure it has the ability to verify in a timely manner that inspectors have met the mandatory training requirements for their Consolidated Records of Authority.”

⁴ Transport Canada fails to meet obligation 5.1 “The State shall provide appropriate facilities, comprehensive and up-to-date technical guidance material and procedures, safety-critical information, tools and equipment, and transportation means, as applicable, to the technical personnel to enable them to perform their safety oversight functions effectively and in accordance with established procedures in a standardized manner.”

Transport Canada sold off two-thirds of its aircraft and reduced flying hours on the few remaining aircraft. This has severely curtailed the ability of inspectors to get to air operators in a timely manner to conduct oversight. [Transport Canada's flying program budget was reduced 60% from 2008/09 to 2016/17.](#) In the case of Edmonton, the Transport Canada office responsible for surveillance activities across Canada's northern Territories and Nunavut, all aircraft were sold and the base in Edmonton was closed. Essentially northern airports and air operators were taken out of the surveillance program due to lack of transportation to conduct on-site activities. Aviation oversight in Canada is not conducted in a standardized manner; not only does the risk-based methodology modify the system, lack of resources, shrinking budgets, time constraints and ease of access to an operator also affect decisions regarding the conduct of oversight.

⁵ [Transport Canada fails to meet obligation 6.](#) *"The State shall implement documented processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations performing an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are allowed to exercise the privileges of a licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval to conduct the relevant aviation activity."*

Transport Canada issued an internal notice to staff in initiating a project that allows air operators to modify their "Company Operations Manuals and associated chapters, Maintenance Policy Manuals, and maintenance control Manuals" without having to comply with the requirements of the Canadian Aviation Regulations for changes to be approved by the Minister. The IPB provides operators "*with the authority to amend and implement changes to their manual immediately.*"

Transport Canada has announced that it plans to relinquish the responsibility for professional pilot qualification exams to industry. Also, Transport Canada's own pilot inspectors are not trained and qualified to carry out many functions in accordance with established requirements and regulations. Yet, Transport Canada continues to task inspectors to carry out tasks for which a valid licence or other currency is required when they are not trained and qualified in accordance with regulatory requirements.

⁶ [Transport Canada fails to meet obligation 7.](#) *"The State shall implement documented surveillance processes, by defining and planning inspections, audits, and monitoring activities on a continuous basis, to proactively assure that aviation licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval holders continue to meet the established requirements. This includes the surveillance of personnel designated by the Authority to perform safety oversight functions on its behalf."*

Transport Canada cancelled the conduct of traditional audits and inspections. TC relies on SMS based processes, even for operators that are not required to have an SMS. By way of an internal notice to staff - [IPB 2016-09](#) - Transport Canada stated: "No planned surveillance activities will be conducted" on a significant portion of the industry including business aircraft, aerial work operators, heliports, aviation parts distributors, and the conduct of SMS assessments of certified airport operators. In briefings conducted with Industry associations in Nov 2016, Transport Canada also announced plans to withdraw completely from the checking of pilot proficiency.

⁷ Transport Canada Fails to meet obligation 8.1 “*The State shall use a documented process to take appropriate corrective actions, up to and including enforcement measures, to resolve identified safety issues.*”

Canada’s Aeronautics Act and Canadian Aviation Regulations provide Transport Canada with all the authority it needs to take appropriate corrective action. Transport Canada has abandoned traditional oversight tools and chooses not to use them. The [Transportation Safety Board commented](#) on this trend in their investigation of the Ornge medivac helicopter crash (TSB Aviation Investigation A13H0001):

“Transport Canada (TC), meanwhile, was aware that Ornge RW was struggling to comply with regulations and company requirements. However, the training and guidance provided to TC inspectors led to inconsistent and ineffective surveillance. In particular, despite clear indications that Ornge RW lacked the necessary resources and experience to address issues that had been identified months before the accident, TC’s approach to dealing with a willing operator allowed non-conformances and unsafe practices to persist.”

⁸ Transport Canada Fails to meet obligation 8.2 “*The State shall ensure that identified safety issues are resolved in a timely manner through a system which monitors and records progress, including actions taken by service providers in resolving such issues.*”

Transportation Safety Board recommendations are not addressed by Transport Canada. Often Transport Canada responds to recommendations in a positive manner but then does not act to implement corrective measures. Various reasons for lack of resolution are cited by Transport Canada. Regardless of the justification, the obligation of the state safety program is not being met.

From: <http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/surveillance-watchlist/multi-modal/2016/multimodal-02.asp>

“There are currently 52 recommendations directed to Transport Canada that have been active for more than 10 or even 20 years and that still have not been fully addressed.”

“Whatever the reason for the delay, the end result is that the TSB continues to find contributory factors and underlying risks in recent accident investigations that are similar to those that gave rise to long-standing recommendations. More timely safety actions are required to mitigate these risks, including, where appropriate, the adoption of short-term measures pending the implementation of permanent solutions”

Reality Check



Transport Canada's dismantling of aviation safety oversight

On April 11th, Transport Canada officials misled, misstated and withheld important information about aviation safety to MPs on the Commons Transport committee. Without intervention, we're heading for tragedy.

REALITY CHECK



Not true. Due to budget cuts, the department has withdrawn completely or substantially reduced safety oversight of entire sectors of aviation including:

- Every airport in your riding
- Business aircraft like those Jim Prentice and Jean Lapierre died in
- Urban heliports
- Aircraft that do dangerous work like fire bombing

These and other decisions were taken without notice to Parliament, MPs or the public and were made without consideration of their impact on safety.

Frontline aviation inspectors believe these measures undermine the safety of the flying public.



In fact, our statistics on the actual oversight activities we carried out will support that (budget cuts did not compromise safety).

In fact, Transport Canada's oversight performance numbers are weak.

During 2016, TC planned fewer than 600 SMS inspections and completed only about half of its plans for two out of three SMS oversight activities.

However, TC's planned 2016 "reactive inspection" numbers are on track. More than 5000 events, accidents and incidents demanded this type of activity, raising questions about TC's "preventative" SMS approach.

While Transport officials may have advised Minister Garneau that 10,000 inspections took place last year, TC's internal numbers just don't add up.

REALITY CHECK



*There is very
active oversight.*

What Transport Canada is not saying is that it is dismantling an already weak oversight system piece by piece.

It has quietly withdrawn oversight from entire sectors of aviation without evaluating the risks involved and plans to do even less oversight. In future, Transport Canada will:

- Completely wash its hands of monitoring the proficiency of pilots
- Delegate professional pilot exams to industry
- Allow airlines to set their own operational safety standards without checking

REALITY CHECK



*Transport Canada
shares and learns our
best practices
internationally through
our participation in the
International Civil
Aviation Organization.*

In reality, Canada is in breach of 8 out of 13 safety standards set out in the current version of ICAO's State Safety Oversight requirements (Annex 19).

In addition, Transport Canada's 5-year SMS review cycle comes no where near ICAO's requirement for annual audits and inspections.



The way that we approach the development of new regulations, new processes, new operating procedures, new practically everything in aviation safety, is to develop them with working groups.

This statement is selective at best.

Transport Canada makes some of its most controversial decisions without consultation and largely in secret.

It is standard practice for Transport Canada's internal documents to be scrubbed clean of controversial passages in public-facing versions. For example, Transport Canada's direction to inspectors to accept the licences of foreign pilots without checking their validity has been deleted from the publicly available document on this topic.

REALITY CHECK



The Transportation Safety Board has raised a number of issues in the last few years, and they have drawn more attention to those with their watchlist. That has been very helpful to Transport Canada in terms of focusing on some of the highest safety priorities.

Transport Canada often responds to the Safety Board by agreeing with their recommendations and then does nothing.

More than 30 recommendations are still awaiting action from Transport Canada 20 years after they were first made by the TSB!

REALITY CHECK



So I can assure you and the committee, Madam Chair, that this has been a priority for us and that we have carried that (mandatory inspector training) out in all of our safety modes in line with what I said before about core obligations.

Not true. According to Abacus Data, almost half (45%) of Transport Canada Civil Aviation Inspectors report that they have not received all the mandatory training required to act on behalf of Minister Garneau, as is their job.

After a 2012 Auditor General report found Transport Canada does not provide training inspectors need to do their jobs, an internal Transport Canada audit in 2016 found the Department still had not acted to resolve these shortcomings.

Seventy per-cent (70%) of inspectors say they are directed to undertake tasks for which they are not trained. For example, inspectors who do not know how to fly a helicopter are overseeing helicopter companies.



...looking at all of the other advanced countries of this world, they keep the training for their pilots in the simulators. It's the same thing for the inspectors as well.

This statement is patently false.

Aviation rules in the European Union and the United States require pilots to meet much more stringent standards in order to keep their licences current, including a requirement to fly an actual airplane. Pilots in Europe are required to have flown an aircraft during the past 24 months and completed at least 12 hours of flight time as captain, including 12 take-offs and landings, among other requirements.

The 703 sector (air taxis) is an area where we have some accidents and we are looking more closely at having our inspectors more on the ground and doing more ramp inspections ...

This is a misleading statement.

Transport Canada long ago abandoned traditional oversight activities such as “ramp checks”, replacing them with SMS oversight only in all sectors. Inspectors have been largely converted into desk jockeys who look at more paper than aircraft.

The air taxi industry experiences more than “some accidents”. The “703” sector is by far the most dangerous. In fact, its rates of accidents and fatalities have led the TSB to undertake a special investigation to determine why air taxis are so unsafe.



This is simply not true.
Transport Canada has not suspended the licence of a single major carrier in decades.



CFPA-APFC

*Canadian Federal Pilots Association
Association des Pilotes Fédéraux du Canada*

The statements herein are direct quotes from senior Transport Canada officials appearing before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities on April 11, 2017, as part of its study of aviation safety. To learn more contact:

Captain Greg McConnell
National Chair
Canadian Federal Pilots Association
613-230-5476

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Aviation Safety Inspector Study

ABACUS DATA

March 2017



Canadian Federal Pilots Association
Association des pilotes fédéraux du Canada

METHODOLOGY

Online survey

The survey was conducted with licensed pilots who work for Transport Canada or the Transportation Safety Board as aviation inspectors/investigators and are members of the Canadian Federal Pilots Association (CFPA).

Sample Size

Based on the response rate and the sample composition, the results of the survey should be considered representative of the opinions of aviation inspectors who are members of the CFPA.

Field dates

March 14th to 22nd, 2017


KEY FINDINGS

- The study reveals an aviation inspectorate that believes Transport Canada's recent decisions to reduce the scope of its safety oversight program will increase the risk of an aviation accident in Canada.
- A wide majority (81%) see Transport Canada's Safety Management Systems (SMS) as a barrier that prevents inspectors from fixing safety problems. Three-in-four (73%) believe SMS has exposed the public to elevated risk.
- A wide majority has little (43%) or no (42%) confidence that the aviation industry can regulate itself under SMS when it comes to safety.
- Almost all (81%) have the ominous belief that a major aviation accident in the near future is likely, given their knowledge of the state of aviation safety in Canada today.

KEY FINDINGS (2)


- With an average of almost 28 years of pilot experience and 11 years working as an inspector, respondents are veteran aviators.
- But, cuts to Transport Canada's flying program have all but grounded most of the department's pilot inspectors. It has been at least a year since most (67%) have flown an actual aircraft. On average, these inspectors have not acted as Pilot-in-Command of an aircraft for three years.
- Meanwhile, seven-in-ten report they sometimes (43%) or frequently (27%) were not trained for assigned tasks. Only 55% had completed all mandatory training required to act on behalf of the Minister of Transport to oversee and ensure compliance with aviation safety requirements.

RESPONDENT PROFILE



AVERAGE

27.6 years as a pilot
11.1 years as an inspector/investigator
8458.8 hours of flight time
3.0 years since last Pilot-in-Command




IMPACT OF REDUCING REGULATORY OVERSIGHT

ABACUS DATA

REDUCING THE SCOPE OF PLANNED SURVEILLANCE WILL INCREASE RISK


In your opinion, will Transport Canada's recent decisions to remove business aviation (CAR 604), urban heliports (CAR 305), aircraft doing aerial work (CAR 702) and aircraft parts suppliers (Standards 563) from planned surveillance:



82% of respondents believe removing CAR 604 (business aircraft), CAR 305 (urban heliports), CAR 702 (aerial work) and Standards 563 (aviation parts distributors) from planned surveillance will increase the risk of an accident

IMPACT OF REDUCING SAFETY OVERSIGHT FOR ALL AIRPORTS

In your opinion, will Transport Canada's recent decision to end SMS assessments for all airports in Canada:




60%

of respondents believe ending SMS assessments for all airports will increase the risk of an accident

IMPACT OF EXEMPTION TO PERMIT EVERY PILOT IN CANADA TO MAINTAIN THEIR LICENCE WITHOUT FLYING


In your opinion, will Transport Canada's recent exemption to permit every pilot in Canada to maintain their licence by simulator alone increase aviation safety in Canada?



Only
16%
of respondents felt that
the exemption
permitting pilots to
maintain their licence by
simulator alone will
increase aviation safety

IMPACT OF REMOVING AIR TAXIS FROM SMS SURVEILLANCE

Transport Canada may soon remove air taxis (CAR 703) from its SMS surveillance program altogether. In your opinion will this move...




AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (SMS)

A BACUS DATA
— • —

PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED SMS COULD IMPROVE AVIATION SAFETY

Do you believe a properly implemented safety management systems (SMS) could improve aviation safety in Canada?




78%

of respondents felt SMS
could increase aviation
safety if properly
implemented

RISK ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORT CANADA'S SMS

In your opinion, has the travelling public been exposed to more or less risk as a result of Transport Canada's reliance on SMS?




73%

of respondents believe the public has been exposed to more risk as a result of Transport Canada's reliance on SMS

SMS PREVENTS SAFETY PROBLEMS FROM BEING FIXED

Given the role of an inspector under Transport Canada's SMS is to be more of an overseer of certificate holder SMS systems, which of the following statements is closest to your own view as an inspector?




- Transport Canada's SMS prevents me from addressing and correcting certificate holder safety problems in a timely fashion/before they happen
- With Transport Canada's SMS, I am better able to address and correct certificate holder safety problems I encounter

81%
of respondents see SMS as
a barrier to addressing
safety problems

SMS PREVENTS SAFETY PROBLEMS FROM BEING FIXED


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- Transport Canada's SMS prevents me from addressing and correcting certificate holder safety problems in a timely fashion/before they happen
- With Transport Canada's SMS, I am better able to address and correct certificate holder safety problems I encounter

PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN AVIATION SAFETY

If the travelling public had your knowledge of Transport Canada's established SMS oversight system, do you think their level of confidence in the safety of Canada's aviation system would:




77%

of respondents felt that the traveling public would have a decreased level of confidence if they knew about SMS

MOTIVATION FOR INTRODUCTION OF SMS

In your view, what is Transport Canada's motivation for having introduced SMS?



81%


Dwindling resources at
Transport Canada is cited
by a wide majority as the
motivation for introducing
SMS

CONFIDENCE IN SELF-REGULATION

ABACUS DATA
• •

CONFIDENCE IN AIRLINE & AIRPORT SELF-REGULATION AND SAFETY

How confident are you personally about air operators, airports, etc. regulating themselves through SMS when it comes to safety?




85%

of respondents had little or no confidence in airline and airport self-regulation when it comes to safety


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
LIKELIHOOD OF A MAJOR AVIATION ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT IN CANADA

Given your knowledge and experience with the state of Canadian aviation system safety, in your opinion how likely is a major aviation accident or incident in Canada in the near future?



LIKELIHOOD OF A MAJOR AVIATION ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT IN CANADA

Given your knowledge and experience with the state of Canadian aviation system safety, in your opinion how likely is a major aviation accident or incident in Canada in the near future?



■ Very likely

■ Somewhat likely

■ Somewhat unlikely

■ Very unlikely

■ Don't know


ABACUS DATA
All respondents, n = 243

FLYING AND TRAINING HISTORY

ABACUS DATA
• •


NUMBER OF TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS

Approximately how many total flight hours have you logged during your career?




NUMBER OF HOURS AS PILOT-IN-COMMAND OR SECOND IN COMMAND IN FISCAL 2015/16

Approximately how many hours have you logged as Pilot In Command or Second In Command in an aircraft within fiscal year 2015/16?




NUMBER OF YEARS SINCE PROFESSIONAL AVIATION CURRENCY PROGRAM INVOLVING AIRCRAFT FLIGHT TIME

How many years have elapsed since the last time you were assigned to a Professional Aviation Currency Program involving aircraft flight time?




MAINTAINED CURRENCY OF PILOT LICENCE AT OWN COST

Have you maintained the currency of your pilot licence on your own at your own cost?




TRAINING FOR INSPECTION/INVESTIGATION DUTIES

With respect to inspection/ investigation duties that you carried out in fiscal year 2015/16 select one of the following statements that best describes the training provided to you by the employer?



COMPLETED ALL MANDATORY TRAINING APPROPRIATE FOR YOUR DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY/RECORD OF AUTHORITY

Have you completed all mandatory training appropriate for your Delegation of Authority/Record of Authority document?



Only
55%
of respondents had
completed all
mandatory training for
their Delegation of
Authority/Record of
Authority document

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Aviation Safety Inspector Study

ABACUS DATA

March 2017



Canadian Federal Pilots Association
Association des pilotes fédéraux du Canada